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In the Supreme Court 
ollhe State ol Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
AND ALL THE JUDGES THEREOF, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 9117 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
On September 10, 1959, this court rendered a decision, 
Case No. 9117, recalling an Alternative Writ it had pre-
viously issued against the Defendants and Respondents, 
prohibiting inspection of the transcript of the testimony 
of witnesses listed on an indictment by the Salt Lake 
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County Grand Jury returned against Theodore I. Guerts 
for "Misconduct In Office." In accordance with Rule 
76(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, appellant herewith 
petitions for a rehearing of said cause on the grounds here-
inafter set forth. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETA-
TION OF THE LAW IN THAT THE HARRIES CASE 
AND THE UTAH STATUTES INTERPRETED THERE-
BY INDICATE THAT A DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED 
TO VIEW THE GRAND JURY TRANSCRIPTS ONLY 
AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF TRIAL. 
POINT II. 
THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT, UPON WHOSE 
OPINION IN CLAGGETT V. JAMES THE MAJORITY 
RELY, HAS, SINCE THE DATE OF THE MAJORITY'S 
OPINION, CLARIFIED ITS POSITION AND THERE-
BY LENT SUPPORT TO THE VIEWS OF PETITIONER. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETA-
TION OF THE LAW IN THAT THE HARRIES CASE 
AND THE UTAH STATUTES INTERPRETED 
THEREBY INDICATE THAT A DEFENDANT IS EN-
TITLED TO VIEW THE GRAND JURY TRANSCRIPTS 
ONLY AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF TRIAL. 
Title 77, Chapter 19, Section 10, Utah Code Annotated, 
plainly states: 
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"No member of the grand jury, nor any person 
at any time present at any session of the grand 
jury, shall disclose what he himself or any other 
grand juror or person may have said at such ses-
sion. No grand juror shall divulge in what manner 
he or any other grand juror may have voted on a 
matter before them. Any grand juror or other person 
may, however, be required by any court to disclose 
the testimony of a witness examined before the grand 
jury, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it is 
consistent with that given by the witness before 
the court, or to disclose the testimony given before 
the grand jury by any person upon a charge 
against such person for perjury in giving his testi-
mony, or upon his trial therefor." 
This section plainly states the exceptions to the general 
rule of secrecy and says the Grand Jury testimony may 
be examined" * * * for the purpose of ascertaining wheth-
er it is consistent with that given by the witness before 
the court." Prior to trial there can hardly be any testi-
mony of a witness before the court. The statute therefore 
precludes any disclosure to show inconsistency until 
there has been testimony to be proven inconsistent. 
This language was thus interpreted by the Utah Su-
preme Court in the case of State v. Harries, 221 P2d 605, 
wherein the court said at page 614 after quoting the above 
noted language: 
"The quoted sections establish that the legis-
lature only intended to lessen the tension of the 
common law rules to the extent of making a tran-
script available to the defendant for impeachm~nt 
purposes * * *. Furthermore the legislature could 
have very easily prescribed that a copy of the 
transcript be furnished the defendant had it in-
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tended to be the case. * * * If use of the transcript 
is limited to impeachment purposes, then defend-
ant could not make a claim of contradictorry stories 
until a witness who had appeared before the Grand 
Jury had testified in the trial of the cause. Until 
that time there could be no showing made that 
there were variances in the testimony of any wit-
ness on the two occasions." 
The District Court exercised its discretion in the Harries 
case and denied defendant's motion to view the Grand 
Jury transcript prior to trial. The above noted passages 
indicate the reasons the Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's action. 
It is true the Supreme Court was merely upholding 
the use of the trial court's discretion and it could be argued 
that this same court would uphold the discretion of a 
trial court in allowing the defendant to view the Grand 
Jury transcript before trial. However, the language used 
in the Harries case, in support of the ruling of the trial 
court, clearly establishes that in no instance could the 
statutory provision for impeachment come into existence 
until trial commences. It is equally clear, no disclosure 
of Grand Jury testimony to a defendant other than for 
impeachment upon the basis of inconsistent statements 
is permitted by command of the legislature. 
Hence the trial court may exercise its discretion only 
after a former Grand Jury witness has testified at trial as 
to whether that witness's Grand Jury testimony may be 
revealed. In short, there is no option allowed the trial 
court until trial has commenced. 
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POINT II. 
THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT, UPON WHOSE 
OPINION IN CLAGGETT V. JAMES THE MAJORITY 
RELY, HAS, SINCE THE DATE OF THE MAJORITY'S 
OPINION, CLARIFIED ITS POSITION AND THEREBY 
LENT SUPPORT TO THE VIEWS OF PETITIONER. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri, in denying a petition 
for rehearing in the case of Claggett v. James. Mo. 
S. A. 2d in a decision handed down on September 14, 1959, 
went to some lengths to clarify and explain their position 
as stated in the opinion cited by the majority. This clari-
fication and explanation voiced after the majority here 
handed down their decision, effectively and clearly sup-
ports the position of petitioner. 
In the case of Claggett v. James the court did allow 
defendant to see the record of the Grand Jury prior to 
trial; however, it must be noted that defendant therein 
alleged four separate instances wherein his access to the 
transcript was necessary. In the instant case, defendant 
has alleged only one, and that one is the very one the 
Missouri Supreme Court specifically rejects, namely that 
preparation for trial will thereby be easier. The court, 
in its latest pronouncement, states in clarification of its 
original opinon, that: 
"In accordance with these cases we hold that 
inspection of grand jury transcript should not be 
permitted for purposes of discovery or as a sub-
stitute for taking depositions of witnesses endorsed 
on the indictment, but only when and to the extent 
that is shown to be necessary to meet the ends of 
justice. * * * Our ruling did not mean that anyone 
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indicted is entitled to all of the testimony of all 
the witnesses before the grand jury even if it is all 
material and relevant, and it might well be an 
abuse of discretion to permit it." 
These pronoucements point up the fatal flaw in de-
fendant's argument. Even conceding arguendo that in 
Utah the law allows grand jury transcript to be viewed by 
a defendant prior to trial, such can only be the case when 
a proper showing of legitimate need has been made, and 
not as a substitute for the established disclosure procedure. 
The fact that defendant could thereby more conveniently 
prepare his case can hardly justify deviation from the 
long established rule of grand jury secrecy. Any informa-
tion which defendant claims he must have through grand 
jury testimony prior to trial or be irreparably damaged, 
may just as easily be acquired through interrogation of 
the witnesses involved who are in no way precluded 
from relating what information they may have concerning 
the particular crime alleged in the indictment. As the U.S. 
Supreme Court said in U. S. v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 
u.s. 669: 
"* * *This indispensable secrecy of grand jury 
proceedings must not be broken except where there 
is a compelling necessity. There are instances when 
that need will outweigh the countervailing policy 
but that must be shown with particularity. No 
such showing was made here. * * * If the grand 
jury transcript were made available, discovery 
through depositions which might involve delay and 
substantital costs would be avoided, yet these 
showings fall short of proof that without the 
transcript a defense would be greatly prejudiced or 
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that without reference to it an injustice would be 
done. * * * We do ~~t reach in this case problems 
concerning the use of the grand jury transcript at 
the trial to impeach a witness, to refresh his rec-
ollection, to test his credibility and the like. Those 
are cases of particularized need where the secrecy 
of the proceeding is lifted discretely and limited-
ly. We only hold that no compeling necessity has 
been shown for the wholesale discovery and pro-
duction of a grand jury transcript * * *. We hold 
that a much more particularized, more discrete 
showing of need is necessary to establish good 
cause." 
Defendant in this case has made the barest showing 
of convenience and no more. Certainly defendant made 
absolutely no showing of "good cause" as discussed in 
the Proctor and Gamble case noted above. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner respectfully submits the decision of the 
majority in the instant case is contrary to the established 
law of the State of Utah as pronounced by the legislature 
and interpreted by this honorable court. The blanket au-
thority granted to defense counsel to go on "a fishing ex-
pedition" for purposes of discovery under the guise of 
trial preparation is contrary to legislative intent as inter-
preted by the Harries Case. Allowing any party indicted 
by a Grand Jury access to the heretofore secret transcripts 
of said Grand Jury upon a bare showing that it would as-
sist his trial preparation ignores established principles 
of law. This does not invoke a court's discretion, but es-
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tablishes procedure wherein through mere formality of 
making a motion to the court he can obtain said tran-
scripts. Is this not the case in each and every instance? 
When then would a defendant be refused? It may also be 
noted that the majority opinion suggests no guides or 
standard for the trial court in the exercise of its discre-
tion. There, too, it appears that the censoring of the tran-
script, or excising of certain portions, would involve 
an exercise of discretion by the trial court which the de-
fendant might be entitled to have reviewed on appeal 
after conviction. 
It is stated by Justice Eager in his dissent in the 
Claggett Case, "The resultant question always is whether 
the ends of justice will be furthered by the request of 
disclosure. This involves not only the rights of the ac-
cused, but the rights and interest of the public in the ad-
ministration of the criminal laws." 
Petitioner in no way concedes that the defendant is 
entitled to the transcripts prior to trial, but to the contrary, 
as we interpret the legislative intent and ruling of the 
Harries Case, defendant is only entitled to the transcript 
after commencement of the trial for the purpose of ascer-
taining whether the trial witnesses' testimony is consist-
ent with that given by him before the Grand Jury, and 
then only upon good cause shown. Assuming arguendo 
that defendant is entitled to view the transcripts prior to 
trial, it is our position that good cause still must be shown 
in order for the trial judge to allow inspection. 
It should be remembered that the divulging of Grand 
Jury testimony is an exception to the general rule and 
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should be engaged in not when the court feels no harm 
will be done thereby, but rather when they are convinced 
great and irreparable harm will result from denial. The 
action of the District Court in granting defendant's motion 
on such a meager showing is clearly an abuse of discretion. 
It is respectifully requested This Honorable Court 
should in the interests of justice review its decision in this 
instance. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAY E. BANKS 
District Attorney 
3rd Judicial District 
PETER F. LEARY 
Deputy District Attorney 
3rd Judicial District 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
RICHARD R. BOYLE 
Assistant Attorney General 
ARTHUR A. A~LEN, JR. 
Special Prosecutor 
Attornll!Js for Appellant. 
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